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ABSTRACT
Memory based vulnerabilities have plagued the computer industry since the
release of the Morris worm twenty years ago. In addition to buffer overflow
attacks like the Morris worm, format strings, ret-libC, and heap double free()
viruses have been able to take advantage of pervasive programming errors. A
recent example is the unspecified buffer overflow vulnerability present in Mozilla
Firefox 3.0. From the past one can learn that these coding mistakes are not
waning. A solution is needed that can close off these security shortcomings
while still being of minimal impact to the user. Antivirus software makers
continuously overestimate the lengths that the everyday user is willing to go to in
order to protect his or her system. The ideal protection scheme will be of little or
no inconvenience to the user. A technique that fits this niche is one that is built
into the hardware. Typical users will never know of the added protection they're
receiving because they are getting it by default. Unlike the NX bit technology in
modern x86 machines, the correct solution should be mandatory and
uncircumventable by user programs. The idea of marking memory as nonexecutable is maintained but in this case the granularity is refined to the byte
level. The standard memory model is extended by one bit per byte to indicate
whether the data stored there is trusted or not. While this design is not unique in
the architecture field, the issues that arise from multiple processing units in a
single system causes complications. Therefore, the purpose of this work is to
investigate hardware based mandatory access control mechanisms that work in
the multicore paradigm. As a proof of concept, a buffer overflow style attack has
vi

been crafted that results in an escalation of privileges for a nonroot user. While
effective against a standard processor, a CPU modified to include byte level
tainting successfully repels the attack with minimal performance overhead.
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1. Introduction
The world of computer security is an ongoing cat and mouse game between
antivirus companies and hackers. In this game, the black hats seem to have the
upper hand as most patches for malicious software are not available until after
the attack is unleashed on an unfortunate group of computers. While updates
are necessary to fix existing problems in already released software, a more
proactive approach to computer security could greatly benefit the everyday user.
This could come in the form of a variety of solutions. One of the more promising
and interesting areas is mandatory access controls. Mandatory access controls
(MACs) in computer systems are memory access protocols that the user cannot
circumvent even if he or she wanted. This can be contrasted with discretionary
controls like the standard read, write, and execute properties that are common to
Windows and Linux platforms. What makes correctly used MACs powerful is the
fact that a user, whether due to ignorance or ill intent, cannot cause harm to the
system. This ability to repel an attack from an insider has led the National
Security Agency to create and adopt a MAC based operating system known as
SELinux [35]. Hardware based MACs can first be seen in an elaborate new
computer architecture introduced in 1960 [24]. Failing to reach the mainstream,
they have been the subject of academic research ever since. These systems
have the ability to enforce security protocols at the lowest level and with little to
no change to existing software which makes the solution both powerful and farreaching. While meeting security goals is important, a successful computer
security solution must also conform to the paradigm of the future.
1

The difficulty in continuously increasing clock speed has caused CPU designers
to resort to increasing the number of cores on a chip in an effort to maintain
exponential growth in computing power. The popularity of this trend can be seen
in a quote from Intel President Paul Otellni, “We are dedicating all our future
product development to multicore designs” [16]. The result of this has been a
programming and security nightmare. The challenge of merely maintaining
consistency across memory has proved to be difficult. A security solution that
doesn’t fit with a multicore design is inherently doomed. Therefore, it is the
purpose of this work to adapt hardware based mandatory access controls to fit
multicore architectures.

1.1.

Motivation

1.1.1. Buffer Overflow Attack Prevalence
Of all the different ways for a hacker to gain access to privileged information or to
disrupt desired functionality, buffer errors are probably the easiest and most
successful. Buffer overflows are just one form of memory based vulnerability,
however, according to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) they still
account for around 12% of all computer vulnerabilities [9] . The number of
vulnerabilities classified as “buffer errors” by the NVD is given in Figure 1.1. It is
important to note in Figure 1.1 that data has only been collected up to the
midpoint of 2008. Extrapolating the year’s trend indicates that in 2008 there will
be over 600 buffer error vulnerabilities. The percentage of all vulnerabilities
which fall into that same category is given in Figure 1.2.
2

Figure 1.1: Number of vulnerabilities classified as buffer errors over time [9]
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Figure 1.2: Percentage of vulnerabilities classified as buffer errors over time [9]
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Even more disturbing is the fact that despite the antiquity of this problem, the
percentage of all vulnerabilities that are of this type has been growing over the
past couple of years. In the face of two decades of research and numerous
solutions, the problem still persists. This thesis proposes a solution to the buffer
overflow problem along with other, less prevalent, memory based vulnerabilities
such as format strings and heap-based attacks.
1.1.2. End User Involvement
The problem is not the lack of solutions, but of a pervasive one that can be
enabled and adapted easily by large populations and that actually solves the
underlying problem. It can be seen from past work that the solutions with the
greatest chance of adoption, and therefore success, are those that require a
minimal amount of effort and skill from the user. Many types of existing solutions
already require too much from their users. People may not be willing to install
update software because they don’t like having to restart their computer
everyday due to new updates. Most users won’t pay a monthly subscription fee
to get the latest antivirus updates. Observations like this can be seen in a more
quantitative way in Figure 1.3 [37]. Despite a plethora of new computer
architectures, the leader continues to be x86 due, in part, to its large installed
base of software. The millions of lines of legacy code still in use means that
requiring developers to substantially change their applications or libraries often
leads to difficult new architectures being labeled unusable.

5

Figure 1.3: Disparity Between Installed User Security Software and Perceived
[37]
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Therefore, the desired solution should be completely backwards compatible with
existing x86 code and require no recompilation or relinking. Often, this type of
solution is one that is hardware based.

1.2.

Background

The first great computer infection, the Morris Worm of 1988, made use of a buffer
overflow exploit in the fingerd application as one of its methods of propagation
[30]. Given the vastness and damage of the worm, one would think that in a
short amount of time a solution would be developed that would inoculate the
world’s computers from such a sickness. However, in 2001, thirteen years after
the Morris Worm, the Code-Red and CodeRedII worms would use another buffer
overrun that would cost $2.6 billion [26]. This is a testimony to the
ineffectiveness of the proposed protection schemes during that thirteen year
period and the overall prevalence of this attack scheme. Unlike standard file
permissions, a proper solution should not be discretionary upon the user's desire,
but should have at least some mechanisms that are mandatory and
uncontrollable even at the privileged operating system level. This level of
security would be enforced by the processor itself, as a fundamental property of
the ISA.
1.2.1. Stack Smashing Attack
One looking for a walkthrough about how to create a buffer overflow attack need
look no further than the archives of the hacker magazine Phrack [2].

7

In 1998, it published a widely cited article giving a walkthrough on how to
construct a buffer overflow attack that is readable at the introductory
programming level. To understand such an attack, first one must consider what
a standard stack frame looks like in memory. This is given in Figure 1.4. A
typical stack smashing attack will attempt to find an unsafe function call like
strcpy(). strcpy() copies the string pointed to by source into the array pointed to
by destination up to and including the terminating null character. The function
prototype for strcpy() is given in Figure 1.5. The security issue arises from the
fact that strcpy() copies data into destination until the null terminating character is
found in source despite the length of either arrays. Good programming practice
dictates that code should be written to make sure that no more characters are
copied into destination then it can hold. Unfortunately, good programming
practices are not always observed. When a source array is not properly bounds
checked, it allows an attack to overflow the destination buffer. Most often, this
buffer is overflowed up to the point of overwriting the return address stored on
the stack. The attacker changes the return address to point back into the buffer
thereby redirecting execution into the attacker supplied string. The resulting
stack frame is shown side by side with a normal one in Figure 1.6. Normally the
attacker stores shell code to exec a shell in the buffer and by this means has his
own prompt to do whatever he/she wishes.

8

Memory Addr
0xFFFF ....

Direction of
Stack Growth

...
Function Args
Return Address
Saved Frame Pointer
Local Variables
...

0x0000 ....

Figure 1.4: Standard Stack Frame
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char * strcpy ( char * destination, const char *
source )
{
...
}

Figure 1.5: Function prototype for strcpy()
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Normal Stack

Memory Addr

Memory Addr
0xFFFF ....

...
...
Function
Function Args
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Stack
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Function Args

Return
Return Address
Address

buffer
Return
Address
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buffer

buffer
buffer
Local
Variables

buffer
Local
Variables
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...

Figure 1.6: Normal and Overflowed Stack Frames
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0xFFFF ....

0x0000 ....

1.3.

Summary

In this chapter, the need for a protection scheme was motivated by the
substantial and increasing number of buffer overflow attacks. Statistics show
that most users are not aware of the security features on their computers.
Regardless if this is because of a lack of knowledge or lack of effort, a successful
solution to memory based vulnerabilities will be one that requires little from the
everyday user. A high level look into stack frames and stack buffer overflows
was also offered. In an effort to thwart stack buffer overflows, many solutions
have been attempted over the years, some of which will be discussed in the next
chapter.
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2. Related work
Since the inception of the modern computer as a device to calculate artillery
trajectories, security has been a concern. With the dawn of the Internet it has
taken on a whole new meaning and importance. In this chapter some historical
attempts to provide security are discussed followed by modern methods that
attempt to achieve a robust system.

2.1.

A Brief History of Secure Architectures

Dating back to 1959, there has been an effort to create more secure processors
by enforcing safety precautions at the hardware level. Capability-based
architectures refer to computer systems that access data using an address that
refers to both the memory object itself and a set of access rights that govern how
that data can be used. For an excellent reference of such architectures see [23].
2.1.1. Burroughs
First shown in the early 1960s, the Burroughs family of processors incorporated
some very sophisticated features for their time [24]. Originally, the B5000 used a
1 bit tag as part of its 32 bit word. The B6000 expanded it to 3 bits and moved it
outside the word. It differentiates data from code and control words and is even
used to indicate type (such as single and double precision floating point). The
hardware enforced security mechanism makes it impossible to execute data as
code or to interpret code as data.

13

2.1.2. System/38
Released in 1980, the IBM System/38 sought to be a totally object-oriented
architecture [18]. The System/38 featured 40 bit words consisting of 32 data bits,
7 bit ECC, and a 1 bit tag. The tag bit is set whenever the data bits contain a
pointer while all other words in memory have their tag bits cleared. These tag
bits cannot be accessed by the instruction interface and cannot be set by the
user. Instead, they are manipulated by instructions that use microcode to build
the pointers and maintain the integrity of the tag bits. User modification of the
pointer results in its tag bits being cleared thus making it invalid for addressing
purposes.
2.1.3. iAPX 432
Introduced in the year after the IBM System/38, the design and layout of the
chipset for the Intel iAPX 432 took over 100 man-years [23]. Memory references
are done using 32 bit long access descriptors (ADs) that specify the actual
address and access rights to an object. A procedure can only address and
manipulate the ADs that are within its execution environment. The access rights
specify whether the possessor of the AD can read from or write to the object or
delete the AD itself. Unfortunately, the iAPX 432 was doomed by performance
problems and an overzealous marketing campaign.
2.1.4. Unisys
A novel computer architecture that is still around today is used by Unisys
Mainframes [41]. The ISA tags each word of memory to indicate how the data
14

stored there can be used. All data references are done through descriptors
generated by the hardware and operating system using instructions unavailable
to ordinary user code. Every memory reference is checked for a valid descriptor
and that the reference is within appropriate bounds. Programs that are running
are not given privilege to descriptors that hold their own code or that of another
program. Furthermore, code and data are kept separate eliminating any
adjacency between buffers and areas containing executable code.
2.1.5. NX bit
Mandatory Access Controls were brought into the mainstream when AMD began
to use an extra bit, the No eXecute bit (NX), to mark pages of memory as nonexecutable [43]. Intel later followed with what it called the Execute Disable bit
[13]. The capability of the processor to take advantage of this sort of functionality
can be queried by the operating system that is running. When activated by
setting the bit IA32_EFER.NXE, memory pages can be marked as not being
executable. This is done by adjusting bit 63 in the corresponding page table entry
for that page of memory. If the protection is running and an instruction fetch to a
linear address translates to a physical address in a memory page that has the
execute disable bit set, a page fault exception will be generated. This sort of
protection is very close to what is desired in protecting memory from memory
based vulnerabilities: there is no effort required of the user other than having a
processor with the ability, it incurs very little memory or performance overhead,
and it is backwards compatible with existing code.
15

To allow for backwards compatibility, Intel decided to give the host OS the ability
to turn non-executable pages on or off. Windows XP Service Pack 2 and
Windows 2003 Service Pack 1 contain patches to take advantage of this
hardware feature by using what Microsoft calls Data Execution Prevention (DEP)
[1]. Shortly after its debut, exploits began to be posted that easily sidestepped
the mechanism [28]. In order to bypass DEP, a ret-libC style attack can be used
to jump to a section of system code marked as executable that can then further
be exploited to disable DEP and return into shell code stored in the original
buffer. If there was no way that a process could disable NX support at runtime,
this exploit would not work.

2.2.

Recent Solutions

In an attempt to close off the buffer overflow attack vector, many solutions have
come about. As the goal of this work is to place a minimal amount of burden on
the user, previous attempts can best be organized along a continuum with the
least user involvement at one end and the most at the other. Within that
continuum, most solutions fall into a particular category depending upon their
level of abstraction: language, compiler, library, application, operating system, or
hardware. These form a gradient as shown in Figure 2.1.
2.2.1. Safe Languages
Buffer overflows arise from the lack of type safety and bounds checking in C.

16

Safe Languages: Java,
Cyclone
Compiler Based: CRED,
StackGuard, Dynamic
Access Control
Safe Libraries:
Libsafe
Applications: Program
Shepherding, LIFT,
Pointer Encryption,
Shadow Threads

Decreasing
Amount of
Required User
Interaction

Operating System
additions: PaX.
Hardware-Based: Secure
Bit2, Raksha, Minos,
DIFT

Figure 2.1: Amount of user involvement required for various type solutions.
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Work has been done in the past to create a programming language that has built
in bounds checking or is otherwise immune to buffer attacks. Despite whatever
security features these languages may have, they normally require code to be
ported from C to the new safe language. Porting this amount of legacy code,
some of which has been lost, to an entirely new language would be a massive
undertaking. Another problem with both language and compiler techniques is the
availability of source code. While open source movements are gaining
popularity, there is still a great amount of proprietary software in use. For
companies unwilling to release the source code, the following techniques would
not work.
2.2.1.1.

Java

The security and portability features of Java make it very desirable to replace C
as the language of choice. There seems to be a growing trend of applications
being written in Java versus other languages [39]. The Java Virtual Machine
(JVM) and corresponding bytecode is what makes Java so portable and safe [8].
Interestingly enough, the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) is written in C, and is
vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks itself [12]. Unfortunately, Java as a
vulnerability solution suffers from the previously stated issues related to legacy
code porting.
2.2.1.2.

Cyclone

Cyclone follows nearly all of C’s lexical conventions and grammar. It also offers
18

the same fundamental and composite data types. Where they differ is on the
issue of security [19]. A cyclone compiler performs a static analysis on the
program and inserts runtime checks into the compiled code at places where
safety is in danger. The compiler can also choose to reject a program based on
a static analysis of its code that deems it unsafe. As compared to the same
program written in C, Cyclone’s slowdown varies from 1X to 3X and as much as
6X in pathological cases that feature a great amount of pointer arithmetic. The
test suite consisted of common web utilities such as http_get and http_post,
and computationally intensive benchmarks like cfrac, maxtmult, and tile
[19]. Subsequently, Cyclone found array bounds violations in three benchmarks,
one of which dates back to the mid 1980s.
2.2.2. Compiler Based Solutions
While compiler based solutions share the requirement of source code availability,
they also have the unique disadvantage of demanding users to recompile their
programs. Many users are unaware of how to do this and many of those who are
may choose not to deal with the hassle of recompiling their programs.
2.2.2.1.

StackGuard

StackGuard, part of the Immunix Linux Distribution, is probably one of the most
well known stack smashing protection schemes available [6]. It is a modified
version of the gcc compiler that automatically inserts “canaries” into the stack
before a function is called [7]. After the function completes, and before it returns
to the return address on the stack, the canary value is checked with a stored
19

version. If the values do not match, then it means that the canary has been
illegally overwritten, and the stack corrupted. A canary may be a simple XOR
with a secret key or an even simpler scheme. A canary that is comprised solely
of null values is adequate to stop buffer overflow attacks. When strcpy() is
called, it will return upon reaching the null value instead of continuing to overwrite
out of bounds data on the stack.
2.2.2.2.

CRED

CRED (C Range Error Detection) is an extension to the GNU compiler that was
developed at Stanford University [33]. It relies on replacing every out-of-bounds
pointer value with the address of a special OOB (out-of-bounds) object created
for that value. At the current state of development, CRED would break when
using an out of bounds pointer in an external library. It was effective against 20
different buffer overflow attacks and also ran 20 open-source programs
consisting of 1.2 million lines of code [33]. The average performance
degradation was 2X but up to 20X for some applications. Incorporating this idea
into the next distribution of an operating system would allow CRED to reach a
large user base without forcing users to recompile existing applications.
2.2.2.3.

Dynamic Access Control

Dynamic Access Control monitors program data that might be indicative of an
attack, even those attacks that do not alter control flow [44]. The dangers of
these types of attacks are demonstrated in [5]. Dynamic Access Control requires
support at both the hardware and micro-architecture level. The compiler
20

identifies program regions in which the data should not be modified as per
program semantics. If there is an attempt to modify this data at runtime, the
hardware detects the attack.
2.2.3. Safe Libraries
Libsafe is an example of a secure library [15]. It intercepts certain unsafe calls
such as strcpy() or fgets() and calculates the maximum allowed size of the buffer
based on the stack frame address, and then calls the safer bounded variant such
as strncpy(). Although this solution has proven to be effective against some stack
overflows, it still suffers some flaws. One specific problem is that it does not
prevent the overflow itself, in-band data within the stack frame can still be
overwritten. As previously mentioned, a system in which just the control flow
data is protected can still be vulnerable to attack. Like other library-based
approaches, it is only applicable when the application is dynamically linked. It will
not be effective for statically linked software or for user defined functions.
2.2.4. Monitoring Applications
2.2.4.1.

Program Shepherding

Program Shepherding is a system built on top of Runtime Introspection and
Optimization (RIO), a dynamic optimizer application, and seeks to stop malicious
code executions by using the concepts of restricted code origins, restricted
control transfers, and uncircumventable sandboxing [20] . When an application is
run under this paradigm, the loader must first determine if the block of
21

instructions is trusted in accordance with a security policy and the origins of the
code, e.g. executable file from the disk or dynamically generated code, and tags
them as executable. This first step is known as restricted code origins. Restricted
control transfers refers to the restriction of jumps and branches from one block of
memory to another only if it is allowed in the security policy, e.g. if the target of
the branch is not tagged as executable, then control transfer should be restricted.
Finally, uncircumventable sandboxing is used to ensure that all implemented
security checks must be done at all times.
2.2.4.2.

LIFT

Low-Overhead Information Flow Tracking is a tainting architecture that is built on
top of the dynamic binary translator StarDBT [3]. A typical tainting scheme would
identify data from untrusted channels (e.g. network, keyboard, USB) and taint, or
tag, that data as being not executable. If this data is copied to a new location or
used as an operand in another instruction, the destination operand would also be
marked as untrusted. Only untainted memory locations would be used as return
address, jump destinations or function pointers. For LIFT, a one bit tag is
associated with each byte of data in memory or in registers. These tags are
stored in a special memory region that generates a protection fault when a
program attempts to access them. Tags for registers are stored in a spare CPU
register. If the architecture has no spare registers, another special memory
region is allocated to store the data. The extra functionality of propagating taint
bits is accomplished by instrumenting the binary with additional instructions that
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keep track of the current taint values. While the overhead is much less than that
of a similar, previous tool, LIFT incurs an average performance slowdown of 3.6X
for SPEC-INT [32].
2.2.4.3.

Pointer Encryption

A novel protection scheme involves encrypting return addresses and function
pointers when they are stored then decrypting them when they are loaded [40].
Since every return address goes through a decryption before it is loaded into
program counter, a typical stack smashing attack would result in execution
jumping to a random location in memory. This is because the address of the
shell code (presumably stored within the overflowed buffer) would be decrypted
and result in an unknown value, but most likely not where the attack desired. In
the original paper, a variety of methods are offered to minimize the encryption
overhead and ensure cryptographic security.
2.2.4.4.

Shadow Threads

A recent innovation takes advantage of evolving multicore architectures by
spawning a “shadow thread” to ensure security of the executing main thread [4].
Ideally, each thread would be running on a separate core thereby making use of
idle cores. First the binary is modified to allocate “shadow memory” which will be
used to indicate the level of trust associated with a piece of data. As the main
thread executes regular program instructions, the shadow thread stays a few
instructions behind and performs regular tainting arithmetic. The two threads use
a synchronizer which relays control flow information from the main thread to the
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shadow thread. Before branches are taken, the main thread waits for the
shadow thread to catch up and then evaluates whether the branch target is safe
or not. The shadow thread serves as a way to get the extra tainting functionality
without adding additional code to the program or introducing new memory
architectures. Runtime performance varied from 1.5X – 5.5X slowdown on a
suite of custom applications and one program from SPEC-INT [4].
2.2.5. Operating System Patches
PaX is a Linux kernel patch written by The PaX Team whose principal author
chooses to remain anonymous. PaX’s main avenues of defense are to mark
data as non-executable and take advantage of address space layout
randomization (ASLR) [34]. By default, PaX marks the following areas as nonexecutable: memory that holds the stack, heap, anonymous memory mappings,
and any section not specifically marked as executable in an ELF file. This
prevents the standard stack-smashing attack since shell code stored in the buffer
on the stack will be marked as non-executable. PaX randomizes the location of
the stack, heap, loaded libraries, and executable binaries thereby greatly
reducing the likelihood of success for attacks that rely on hard coded addresses,
such as a standard ret-libC attack. This protection, when combined with a
hardware protection scheme such as the NX bit provides for powerful protection.
It should also be noted that a successful attack on PaX has been published on
Phrack [27]. It directly calls the dynamic linker’s symbol resolution procedure to
get around the ASLR aspect of Pax and then uses a traditional ret-libC exploit.
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2.2.6. Hardware Based Solutions
Another class of buffer overflow prevention techniques are those that make
modifications to the actual hardware of a CPU. By doing so, users would benefit
from these additional features upon buying a new system and most likely would
not even know they were there. Users wouldn’t have to recompile the programs
they have, download new ones, or manually patch their OS. Most hardware
based solutions use the notion of “tainting” memory locations. These taint bits
are either all stored together in one continuous piece of memory or are tacked on
to the end of every memory location. The latter is the more common case and
has the advantage of being able to move and operate on taint bits with each
instruction. In this particular scenario, all registers, caches, cache lines, and
main memory would have to be widened by some amount. The operating
system is expected to identify unsafe channels of input and mark the
corresponding data as it streams into the computer. This change to the OS can
be expected with the new hardware that the user buys.
2.2.6.1.

Secure Bit2

Secure Bit2 extends every memory word and register by one bit which is used to
add semantic meaning to each word of memory [31]. This bit is moved along
with its associated word by memory manipulating instructions. Words in buffers
passed between processes get their secure bit set while all others mark the
secure bit at the destination register or memory location. Call, return, and jump
instructions check the secure bit and if set, generate an interrupt or fault signal.
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Modifications are required at the kernel level to set the secure bit when passing a
buffer across domains. Since the address validation is done in hardware, there
is no performance overhead. Memory overhead is related to the total size of
memory, for n words of memory, an additional n bits are needed.
2.2.6.2.

Raksha

Raksha offers multiple active security policies that can all be run simultaneously
and are also programmable [11]. In this setup, every word of memory is
extended by 4 bits, one for each security policy running. Each processor
instruction carries out some operation for each of the security policies, one of
which is solely devoted to high level attacks like SQL injection. This is what sets
Raksha apart from many other hardware based solutions: the ability to recognize
this type of sophisticated attack. In addition, software can modify the tag rules
for each policy and configure how tags from multiple operands are combined.
Raksha even allows a user to specify custom rules for a small number of
individual instructions. These modifications were made to the open source Leon
SPARC V8 processor and synthesized to a FPGA. The additional hardware
caused a 7% increase in size over an unmodified Leon. Performance slowdown
on SPEC ranged from 1X – 2.98X [11].
2.2.6.3.

Minos

While Raksha is one of the newer tainting architectures, Minos is one of the older
ones Error! Reference source not found.. Like Secure Bit, Minos extends
each 32 bit word with a single integrity bit. The security policy can be
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summarized as follows: any subject may modify any object if the object’s integrity
is not greater than that of the subject, but any subject that reads an object has its
integrity lowered to the minimum of the object’s integrity and its own. These
operations are carried out in parallel with the normal functionality of the
instruction. Minos is implemented and tested on the Pentium emulator known as
Bochs. When an attempt is made to transfer control flow to low integrity data, the
processor traps to the kernel for error recovery. A similar architecture is offered
by Chen, et. al. in [42].
2.2.6.4.

DIFT

Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) also features modifications to the
standard memory model by storing an extra bit for each byte of memory [36].
The memory overhead was greatly reduced by using multi-granularity tags. Each
page of memory contains two extra bits which are used to indicate if all the taint
bits on that page are the same and if they are all marked as trusted or not. If
needed, the processor generates an exception to allocate more memory for
individual bytes on a page, but by default marks all taint bits the same. This
method reduced total memory overhead from 12.5% to 0.21% due to common
occurrence of entire pages of memory having the same tag. Despite being
publicized in 2004, DIFT remains the only tainting scheme that makes use of
multi granularity tags. Two different policies are offered depending on the
amount of performance one is willing to sacrifice in exchange for security. This
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approach also uses binary annotation to recognize when data is properly bounds
checked. When this occurs, the destination buffer can be marked as trusted.

2.3.

Summary

This chapter explores some of the past attempts to eliminate memory based
vulnerabilities dating back to 1959. Recent efforts up to 2007 have also been
examined. Ranging from requiring developers to code in an entirely different
language to coming built into new computer designs, they provide differing levels
of security based on the amount of performance sacrificed or user involvement
necessary. By examining the advantages and disadvantages of past solutions, a
novel computer architecture that protects against buffer overflows is offered.
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3. Approach
After thoroughly studying past and present protection schemes as well as
modern attacks, the goal of this thesis is to provide a solution that fulfills the
following requirements:
Provides protection from known memory based vulnerabilities such as
buffer overflows
Works with existing legacy code
Does not require recompilation
Is compatible with emerging trends in processor architectures (multicore)
Gives the maximum amount of security while sacrificing the least amount
of performance
Requires the least amount of user intervention
Is mandatory as opposed to discretionary

3.1.

Design Details

Working from these goals towards a specific solution leads one to believe that
the correct approach is one that is hardware based. By employing a hardware
based protection scheme, the user gains a security advantage without having to
install new software or recompile their existing software. Whenever the user
buys their new system, the protections are built in.
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3.1.1. Memory extension
3.1.1.1.

Byte or Word?

In the past, some tainting architectures have chosen to add one bit per byte [11]
[36] [32] [42] [21] while others have chose to taint per 32 bit word [31] [9]. This
approach will follow the former, more popular scheme. That is, every
addressable memory location remains 8 bits wide but also has a one bit tag at
the end. So each 4 byte word will have 32 bits of data along with 4 one bit tags
interspersed throughout its bytes. Many processors, particularly x86, allow byte
granularity memory access. Even though compilers normally align memory
accesses to words or double words, there are still many cases in C that make
word level tainting impractical. Aggregate types such as unions are one
particular problem because they are often accessed in different ways, even
without modifying data. On the other hand, a difficulty that arises from tainting at
the byte level comes when data is accessed in large chunks that contain
separate taint values. For example, imagine a union that can be accessed as 4
chars or 1 integer. If the chars were stored separately, they could each have a
different taint value. Which does the CPU use in computing the taint value for
the destination? In this work, the taint values are ORed together so that the
result is the least trusted of all the bytes.
3.1.1.2.

Architecture

The taint bit extension has to be made to every single memory location including
registers, caches, and main memory. An abstract view of this CPU is shown in
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Figure 3.1. The additional hardware is shown by a darker shade. This particular
CPU is a four core system that is composed of 2 dual core packages. The
diagram is based on the Intel Core 2 Quad architecture codenamed Kentsfield
with model numbers in the Q6xx0 range [17]. Each core has its own L1
instruction and data cache and shares a unified L2 cache with the other core on
the package. The taint unit of the L1 instruction cache must be wired to the ALU
for verification in the case of a branching instruction. The tainting ALU (TALU)
enforces the taint propagation rules for combining tainted and untainted data.
The registers also have been extended to accommodate the taint bits and
forward their status on to the TALU as well. While at first the wiring complexity
may seem staggering, one should keep in mind that Figure 3.1 is just an abstract
view of what the processor would look like. In reality, taint bits wouldn’t be kept
in a separate space on the same level of memory. Instead, they would be kept
right beside the data as if each memory location were 9 bits wide. Adding one
extra wire for each byte of data should not drastically complicate the wiring of a
modern CPU. An extensive study of the area required to implement tagging bits
is made in [9] and is estimated to be less than 0.5% for per-word tagging. Even
with per byte tagging, the cost will be minimal compared to the size of modern
x86 processors.
3.1.1.3.

Overhead

Memory overhead for byte level tainting is 12.5%. A sample stack with taint
extensions can be seen in Figure 3.2.
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This is a small price to pay for additional security. At the current rate that
memory densities are growing, this price can be paid in a very short time by
Moore’s Law.
All memory and cache lines will also have to be extended to facilitate transporting
the extra information along the data path. Taint bits are passed through the
memory hierarchy from registers to L1, L2, or main memory right alongside the
actual data.
3.1.2. Taint Propagation Rules
Most importantly, a set of rules must be devised for how taint bits interact with
each other. From a security standpoint, most of these rules are pretty
straightforward. For example, the taint value for the result of an addition
operation should be the least trusted of the two operands. For this application, a
taint value of “1” means that the data stored at that location is not trusted.
Conversely, a taint value of “0” means that that particular piece of memory is safe
to branch to. A set of taint propagation rules is listed in Table 3.1. These rules
are a modified set based on the rules in [11] [36] [32] [42] [21]. Note that ALU
represents typical ALU operations such as ADD, SUB, OR. The special case
XOR entry in the table corresponds to a commonly used compiler technique to
clear a register. In doing so, the destination register will be all zeros and can be
considered to be trusted.
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Table 3.1: Taint Propagation Rules.
Instruction

Meaning

Rules

ALU R1, R2, R3

R1 <- R2 + R3

T[R1] <- T[R2] OR T[R3]

LW R1 IMM(R2)

R1 <- Mem[R2+IMM]

T[R1] <- T[R2] OR T[IMM]

SW R1, IMM(R2)

Mem[R2+IMM] <- R1

T[R2+IMM] <- T[R1] OR T[IMM]

XOR R1, R2, R2

R1 <- R2 XOR R2
(R1 <- 0)

T[R1] <- 0
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3.1.3. Additional ALU functionality
Additionally, the CPU is modified to propagate taint information while performing
normal operations. Typical assembly commands like add or load now contain
extra functionality. This extra functionality comes from the ALU itself, not
instructions that are annotated to the binary. This allows legacy code to run
without having to recompile or instrument the executable. Given the scale and
complexity of modern chips, the additional space required to carry out the taint
propagation rules will be minimal because the operators are so simple. Branch
instructions like RET, CALL, or JMP must validate the taint bits before branching
to that location.
3.1.4. Floating Point, MMX and SSE
Since floating point data should never be used as the target for a branch or
return instruction, all floating point data is marked as tainted. Memory extensions
are not needed by the FPU or FP registers because when writing floating point
data back to memory, it is automatically marked as untrusted.
Multimedia / vector instructions such as MMX and SSE and all their variations
can be considered in the same way. No extra functionality is performed by these
instructions because they operate on floating point data and as such are forced
to write back to memory with low integrity.
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3.1.5. Reaction to Attack
When a branching instruction is found to be tainted, an attack is signaled. Upon
discovery, there are a variety of options that could be taken: trap to the operating
system, terminate the process, or attempt to recover. For the time being,
whenever an attack is found, the application is terminated. Repeated attack
attempts could lead to a Denial of Service but this a better result than a hacker
hijacking control flow.

3.2.

Bochs

The proof of concept for this work is done using an IA-32 emulator called Bochs
[22]. Bochs is an open source C / C++ project maintained on SourceForge.
Within the computer architecture community, it is a commonly used tool to verify
designs, particularly experimental ones [31] [9] [40]. By using Bochs the
developer gets a chance to quickly see the results of changes made to the
internals of a CPU. Modifications can be tested by running different applications
on their new, unique design. Bochs uses a custom BIOS and can emulate a
standard PC including memory, DMA, I/O devices, and an x86 CPU with MMX
and SSE instructions. A variety of processor cores can be emulated ranging
from x386 to P4.
Any machine with a C++ compiler can run Bochs provided they have the correct
display libraries. The ability to run on a variety of host operating systems while
emulating a machine running a different OS makes Bochs useful for virtualization
or running Linux programs natively on a Windows machine or vice versa.
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Figure 3.3 shows a screenshot of Bochs using Windows XP as its host OS.
Inside the emulator, Bochs is running Redhat 6.0. Some other tested guest
operating systems are FreeDOS [14], openBSD [29], and nearly every flavor of
Windows including Vista [25]. By downloading the Bochs source code and
making changes to it one can easily experiment with the internal design of CPU.
A snippet of the code used to emulate the ADD EAX, Immediate instruction is
shown in Figure 3.4. If, for example, a printf() statement were entered in the
function then every time that the assembly instruction was executed Bochs would
print a statement to the terminal in Windows. A more practical use would be to
add some sort of extra functionality to the add instruction. One such use would
be propagating taints bits. Being written in C makes Bochs much more
accessible and easier to use than other hardware simulators. At program startup,
extra storage area for taint bits had to be allocated. Each and every integer ALU
instruction had to be modified to include taint bit propagation as dictated by the
tainting rules in Table 3.1.
3.2.1. Implementation
To facilitate testing of this new processor design, Bochs was modified to include
taint bits for each memory location. This involved slight modifications to many
Bochs functions. Dissecting and understanding the interactions and overall
functionality of an open source program such as Bochs proved to be quite
challenging. Memory load and store instructions had to be modified to store the
correct taint bits after doing the lookup from virtual address to physical address.
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Figure 3.3: Redhat Linux running under Windows XP through the Bochs
Emulator
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void BX_CPU_C::ADD_EAXId(bxInstruction_c *i)
{
int op1_32, sum_32;
op2_32 = i->Id();
op1_32 = EAX;
sum_32 = op1_32 + op2_32;
RAX = sum_32;
SET_FLAGS_OSZAPC_ADD_32(op1_32, op2_32,
sum_32);
}

Figure 3.4: Bochs Code Snippet for Add EAX, Imm instruction
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The ALU had to be modified to not branch to addresses that were marked as
insecure. If the target of a branch instruction was untrusted, the program is
terminated. Before the performance and security of the overall system could be
tested, the modified version of Bochs had to successfully boot a Linux disk
image. Upon doing so, actual testing to verify Boch’s ability to repel attacks
could begin.

3.3.

Summary

In this chapter, the idea of extending memory to include taint bits on a per byte
basis was presented. A logical overview of how a modified system would look
was provided. To go along with this depiction, some estimations were made
concerning die size and memory overhead required to produce processors of this
type. A set of rules was laid down describing the interactions between taint bits
depending on the currently executing instruction. Bochs, the platform for the
proof of concept of this work, was described along with a description of the
changes made to it. The next chapter will describe the performance of this
modified CPU.
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4. Results and Discussion
To test and verify the proposed architecture, an attack was constructed then
tested on an unmodified version of Redhat 6.0 running under Bochs. Being able
to show a successful attack before modifications and a repelled attack with
protections in place is adequate to demonstrate a security advantage.

4.1.

The Attack

A buffer overflow style attack was written using [2] as a guide. The attack comes
in two parts: an exploit program that constructs the malicious string and a
program that has a vulnerable strcpy() call.
4.1.1. Exploit Program
The purpose of the first program is to form a malicious string that can then be
used to overflow another program’s buffer. The application takes a buffer size
and an offset from its own stack pointer as parameters to create the string. With
these numbers, the program creates an “egg” which is a malicious string that
consists of a NOP sled, shell code, and return addresses. The NOP sled is
placed at the bottom of the egg to allow for some error in the return address. If
the return address returns anywhere in the NOP sled then an unspecified
number of NOPs is run until the shell code is reached. After determining the
correct length of the buffer to overflow, the length of the NOP sled and return
address region are calculated based on the amount of shell code which will be
put in the buffer.
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A memory layout of the egg is given Figure 4.1. This egg is stored in an
environment variable for easier access. The purpose of the code in the buffer is
to open a shell by using the system() command. When paired with a poorly
coded vulnerable program, this combination makes for a particularly dangerous
attack.
4.1.2. Vulnerable Program
The program which will be attacked is a simple rootecho program. On a
nonprivileged account it uses setuid() to run at root privilege. This characteristic
makes the program particularly enticing to exploit because the attacker can gain
root access if the exploit is done correctly. The intended purpose of the program
is to echo the first command line argument given with it. The code for this
program can be found in Figure 4.2.
4.1.3. A Successful Attack
A successful attack involves a number of different things. First, the exploit
program must be run to create the malicious string. Knowing the approximate
size of the target buffer is greatly helpful in this process. The popularity and
prevalence of open source software makes this much easier than it may have
been in the past. Open source software also helps hackers to identify vulnerable
programs. By running grep and examining locations where unsafe function calls
are made, an attacker can easily find a suitable target. Second, the vulnerable
program needs to be run using the malicious string as input. Lastly, it helps to be
a little lucky since stack addresses can vary from execution to execution.
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Figure 4.1: An egg that would be used to overflow a buffer.
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Figure 4.2: Rootecho program.

45

However, the NOP sled goes a long ways to reduce the chances of returning into
the wrong address. A successful attack showing an elevation to root privilege is
shown in Figure 4.3. A portion of the string is printed to the screen before a root
shell is given.

4.2.

Defense

The proposed solution effectively prevents the above attack from being
successful. Stopping an attack from gaining root privileges is noteworthy and
validates the approach taken in this work. Instead of the attacker having
unfettered access to someone’s machine, the result of an attack is a
segmentation fault. As stated previously, the semantics of branching functions
are modified to validate the taint bits associated with the destination. When this
location is found to be tainted, the instruction is not executed and the program
crashes. A screenshot of this is given in Figure 4.4. Again, a portion of the
attack string is printed, but this time a segmentation fault is given instead of a
root shell.

4.3.

Discussion

The above results demonstrate the ability to prevent a typical stack smashing
attack. While this particular example may seem simple, an unprotected system
can be successfully exploited exactly this easily. As previously mentioned, the
goal of this work was to provide a hardware based solution that would be helpful
to the everyday while requiring little to no effort on their part.
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Figure 4.3: Successful attack.
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Figure 4.4: An unsuccessful attack
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A fully functional and updated SELinux machine would not be susceptible to the
demonstrated attack. At the same time, understanding and maintaining a
SELinux computer is a challenging task in its own right. Failing to grasp all the
nuisances and security policies of the operating system usually results in a
number of applications being labeled insecure and thus, unusable. On the other
side of the spectrum is the supposed user friendliness of Windows. While
Windows may be the everyday user’s operating system of choice, it is certainly
not the most secure. The popularity of Windows among laymen has made it the
most popular platform for attack by hackers because of the number of people
using it insecurely. The lengths that one has to go to in order to keep their
version of Windows up to date are substantial at times [38]. Because of this,
some users may elect to disable automatic updates spurred in part by the
frequent restarts required for an update to take effect. Presumably, this would
lead to one of the more exposed systems imaginable: an out of date Windows
machine.

4.4.

Summary

This chapter detailed the exploit and vulnerable programs that were used to test
the modified multicore CPU. A buffer overflow attack was used in combination
with a program that used an unsafe call to strcpy() resulting in escalation of
privileges for a nonroot user. A processor that features byte level tainting was
able to repel this same attack under an identical test environment. A computer
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featuring this type of processor would be immune to stack smashing attacks
without ever requiring the user to install new software, download updates, or
recompile existing software. The mandatory nature of this protection scheme
would make circumventing it particularly difficult. All of this is accomplished while
still being backwards compatible with legacy code.
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5. Conclusions
Memory based vulnerabilities have been a serious problem over the past two
decades. Over that time, a great deal of work has been done to overcome them.
However, much of this work required a substantial amount of expertise and
involvement from the user and was therefore unsuccessful. For this reason,
exploits as simple as buffer overflows remain dangerous despite their age. The
subject of this work has been to close off this attack vector while requiring the
least amount of user intervention. To accomplish this goal, a hardware based
mandatory access control mechanism was implemented. This allows for existing
legacy code to be executed natively without recompilation. To be practical, the
design was made with multicore consideration, an aspect of tainting that has yet
to be researched. To demonstrate its ability to repel attacks, a pair of programs
were created that result in a root shell for an unprivileged user. These programs
were successfully exploited on a typical system using the x86 emulator Bochs.
When the hardware MAC was implemented, the attacks failed. This was
accomplished with only a 12.5% memory overhead and little to no performance
degradation.

5.1.

Future Work

As the system seems to show promise, there remains work to be done. At the
forefront of this list would be an actual VHDL implementation that could then be
run on a FPGA. Many FPGAs already feature hard processors and can run
Linux. Creating a custom data path that features this hardware MAC would be a
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challenge worth the time and effort. Unfortunately, this requires the VHDL code
for an actual processor. Since the platform of choice for this work was x86, the
code could be difficult to come by. If the platform were not important, there is a
popular SPARC open source core available called Leon. Instantiating multiple
cores on an FPGA and then recreating these attacks would be a major step.
In addition to the next steps in implementation, a variety of new attacks should be
tested also. The number of attacks that specifically target multicore architectures
are few but growing. Capturing one of these attacks in the wild and then testing
it on Bochs or an FPGA would be productive work as well.
Along the way, it is expected that the design would be continuously updated as
well. Having a graceful return from a detected attack would be favorable
compared to a segmentation fault. In the latter case, repeated attacks could
result in a Denial of Service (DoS). For some companies such as Amazon, a
successful DoS attack can be very damaging.
Another goal is to recognize properly bounds checked data and untaint it.
Previous tainting schemes have attempted this with varying degrees of success.
The difficulty is recognizing a set of instructions that qualifies as a bounds check.
Moving the solution up to the compiler level would solve this problem, but require
source code and recompilation.
All of these areas deserve future consideration but at the time being, the solution
serves its purpose in defending against buffer overflow style attacks.
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Appendix A – exploit.c
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#include <stdlib.h>
#define DEFAULT_OFFSET
#define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE
#define NOP

0
512
0x90

char shellcode[] =
"\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\x
b0\x0b"
"\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x
40\xcd"
"\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
unsigned long get_sp(void) {
__asm__("movl %esp,%eax");
}
void main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
char *buff, *ptr;
long *addr_ptr, addr;
int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE;
int i;
if (argc > 1) bsize = atoi(argv[1]);
if (argc > 2) offset = atoi(argv[2]);
if (!(buff = malloc(bsize))) {
printf("Can't allocate memory.\n");
exit(0);
}
addr = get_sp() - offset;
printf("Using address: 0x%x\n", addr);
ptr = buff;
addr_ptr = (long *) ptr;
for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4)
*(addr_ptr++) = addr;
for (i = 0; i < bsize/2; i++)
buff[i] = NOP;
ptr = buff + ((bsize/2) - (strlen(shellcode)/2));
for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++)
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*(ptr++) = shellcode[i];
buff[bsize - 1] = '\0';
memcpy(buff,"EGG=",4);
putenv(buff);
system("/bin/bash");
}
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